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CONTENTS

25X1

USSR-US-UN: Moscow is supporting the Swedish draft resolution on arms control. (Page 2)

25X1

25X1

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USSR - US - UN: [Moscow is supporting the Swedish draft resolution on arms control in the UN, despite Washington's objections.]

[Yesterday the Soviets voted for the resolution in the main political committee and will undoubtedly take the same position in the General Assembly. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement presented to Ambassador Beam on 29 November rejected the US contention that this year's resolution, like last year's, impinged on the US-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations.]

[According to Moscow, the fact that the present Swedish draft appeals to "all" nuclear states to halt testing and development of strategic weapons, whereas last year's resolution was directed only at the two superpowers, requires a change in the Soviet position. The Soviets contend that Washington's position that the two documents are essentially similar is "devoid of foundation." Further, Moscow argues that to abstain in the voting on the present draft--as the US and the USSR did last year--would undercut the Nonproliferation Treaty.]

[In denying the US contention that support for the Swedish draft would represent a departure from the confidential nature of SALT, the Soviet statement charges that the US has already violated that aspect of the talks. It says that the American press "has divulged" and "continues to divulge" the course of SALT deliberations and has distorted Moscow's position in the process. The statement claims that the Soviets have "scrupulously" lived up to the obligation to keep SALT confidential.]

[Soviet motives in splitting with the US on the Swedish resolution seem largely tactical. Moscow has the opportunity to line up with the non-nuclear

states on an issue of considerable importance to the latter, making the US appear the major obstacle to unverified moratoriums; this provides additional propaganda justification for Soviet testing programs. In addition, the Soviets will have something to use against the Chinese. In parting company with the US on this issue, the Soviets most likely judge that they are not adversely affecting the prospects for SALT's outcome.

25X1

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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